Lijnders’ impact on Liverpool’s system
So, this is a piece I’ve been working on for quite some time now.
Back in September 2019, I put together an article for the Liverpool Echo looking at Pep Lijnders as a potential successor to Jurgen Klopp as Liverpool manager. You can read the piece in full here if you’re interested.
I went back and watched his NEC side to get a better understanding of what Lijnders was about as a manager. What was his managerial style? What tactics was he fond of?
His first game at the helm was a home match against Go Ahead Eagles and immediately it all seemed familiar. At the time of writing that piece for the Liverpool Echo, the Reds had been using their wide forwards in fairly wide areas, almost as wingers.
They would hold the width while the central midfielders would push on and occupy the spaces either side of the centre-forward. It was noticeable in the 4-1 win over Norwich City on the opening day of the season and then in the Super Cup match against Chelsea.
In the example above, Roberto Firmino is the widest player on the left while Sadio Mane plays centrally. It is James Milner making the run between the two forwards while the Reds build play on their right-flank.
In this example, you can see Salah in the wide right position with Milner and Jordan Henderson either side of Firmino.
This was the dynamic early on in the 2019/20 campaign. It differed from what we’d seen during the 2018/19 season when the midfielders acted more as facilitators, allowing the full-backs to join the attack and hold the width while Mane and Salah cut inside.
It was a short-lived experiment with Klopp reverting to the tried and tested formula after a few weeks. I’m not entirely sure why, though it could’ve been tied to the fact the Reds struggled to keep clean sheets. In their opening 12 matches across the Premier League and Champions League, Liverpool kept just two clean sheets and conceded 13 goals. That may have influenced the manager’s thinking.
Why am I talking about this now? Well, this shape is also similar to the one being used by the Reds this season too. We’re seeing the midfielders vacate their zones in the middle third to support the attack in central areas. We’re also seeing the full-backs pop up in central areas on a regular basis.
When things are going well, there is not an in-depth inquest into why this is the case. However, when things aren’t going well, it is analysed to the nth degree.
The team haven’t yet nailed this new approach and we’re seeing gaps in midfield that are exploited during transitions. Post-match chatter always seems to centre on why. Why is Klopp persisting with it? Why are Liverpool using their full-backs in such an odd way? Why is Salah now more of a creator? Why has there been such a shift for one player - Darwin Nunez?
Evolution was the buzzword this summer and not just because of the arrival of Darwin. Liverpool are perpetually evolving, just some changes are a little more drastic than others.
I think what we’re witnessing now has been in the works since the summer of 2019. It may have been executed earlier had the players been in place. It has been a bit of a slow burn that we have been building towards.
There was the change early on in the 2019/20 campaign, as mentioned above. Then Thiago and Diogo Jota arrived in the summer of 2020. Liverpool had a No9 who would look to get in behind instead of just dropping deep and they had a controller in midfield to make it a solid double pivot in the build-up. The club then added a more natural winger in Luis Diaz and Darwin is more of a traditional No9.
The next target is a midfielder and say the club do manage to land Jude Bellingham, he is much more of a goal threat than Jordan Henderson. In theory, if he played the role the skipper is in now on the right, the team would be better. That is clearly the aim, to get everyone up to speed with what is next so that when new arrivals join, they can seamlessly slot in.
What is interesting is that a lot of the playing profiles now suit the system Lijnders deployed while in Holland.
Anass Achahbar was Lijnders’ first choice centre-forward despite only being 5ft8. He was previously and attacking midfielder but adapted with ease. He would often look to pin the last line and his clever movement created opportunities. He scored a career-high 15 league goals during the 2017/18 campaign. It is the only time he has netted double figures. Achahbar shares some similarities with Jota.
The back-up centre-forward was Sven Braken, a 6ft2 unit who was everything you expect a No9 to be. Remind you of anyone in the current Liverpool squad? Braken also had the best season of his career.
The wildcard in the attack, however, was Arnaut Danjuma. Yes, the same Danjuma linked with Liverpool for the best part of two years.
Used on the left side, Danjuma was devastating when isolated one-on-one with the opposition. It is almost identical to how the Reds are looking to use Diaz. The Dutch forward scored 11 goals in 28 outings during that season, a figure he has bettered only once.
Circled in red, Danjuma picks the ball up in space and easily bypasses the man looking to get close to him. He attacks the outside before looking to cut back onto his favoured right foot.
From here, he curls the ball into the far corner and beyond the goalkeeper.
If you look at the above example, it looks remarkably similar to the first example from Liverpool’s Super Cup match against Chelsea, just flipped. Instead of building down the right, NEC are attacking their left and instead of the left-sided midfielder joining the attack, it is the right-sided one. You can just about see the centre-forward to the left of the picture.
Danjuma is the player circled and he’s receiving the ball from the man in midfield. How often have we seen Diaz in these positions this season? He drops deep, gets on the ball and then looks to attack the space.
Mart Dijkstra was usually the man on the left of the midfield three and he averaged more passes than anyone in the team. Gregor Breinburg anchored the midfield and would tend to cover the space on the right whenever NEC moved to a double pivot in possession.
The right-sided midfielder was Ferdi Kadioglu, a versatile winger who also played as wing-back and as an attacking midfielder. He was given the freedom to make it a front four and he chipped in with seven goals. He impressed that season as a teenager and was signed by Fenerbahce in the summer of 2018.
If you break down their team by profile, it does overlay with the key roles in the Liverpool XI. The controller on the left side of midfield and the attacking threat from the right-sided midfielder. You then have the smaller centre-forward backed up by a more stereotypical No9 with a winger on the left side of the attack.
The full-backs would underlap for NEC due to the wide positions being taken up by the forwards. It is all there. A problem for Lijnders was he tried to do too much too soon with the group. NEC conceded 29 goals in the 22 matches under the Dutch tactician but did score 39 times.
Now, it does appear as though the Reds have tried to do a little too much too soon this season but the groundwork was put in back in 2019. We might not see the final version of this idea until after the summer of 2023 once the midfield has had a bit of an overhaul. It might simply be a case of short-term pain now for long-term success.
I think Liverpool are trying to execute a system that Lijnders has been working on since 2017.